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Public research funding systems in central  
and eastern Europe: between excellence and 
relevance: introduction to special section 
Slavo Radosevic and Benedetto Lepori 
Transformation of public research funding systems in central and eastern Europe (CEE) represent a 
natural experiment whereby different funding systems have developed from relatively common 
heritage of the socialist system. In this introduction that builds on the three papers of this thematic 
issue we argue that in medium and long-term the key challenge of CEE countries’ research funding 
systems is to achieve balance between scientific excellence (static allocative efficiency) and socio-
economic relevance (dynamic efficiency). The achievement of this trade-off is an institutional issue par 
excellence; it does not represent optimum but contextual fit, and is determined through interaction of 
macro funding rules and market structure of the research system. In order to evaluate this fit we should 
approach research funding as a multifaceted process composed of functional, path-dependent and 
political as well as learning dimensions. 
UBLIC RESEARCH FUNDING systems in 
central and eastern Europe (CEE1) are impor-
tant parts of innovation systems of these econ-
omies. Reforms of these systems are essential if these 
countries are to be transformed from being European 
periphery to its core and to achieve the grand project 
of European cohesion and convergence. 
After 20 years of post-socialism, substantial 
changes in CEE countries’ funding systems have 
taken place, which provide a unique opportunity to 
evaluate the outcomes of this natural experiment 
from a science policy perspective. Although these 
systems have relatively common initial conditions of 
heritage of the socialist period, they have evolved in 
quite different directions which defy grouping them 
in one ‘east European’ funding model (see Lepori et 
al, this issue). An in-depth understanding of this 
funding pattern is not only relevant from a science 
policy perspective but also it has broader importance 
for understanding institutional change in general. 
While contributions in this thematic section of 
this issue of Science and Public Policy (SPP) dwell 
on particularities of specific aspects of public fund-
ing systems, this introduction aims to give a broader 
evidence and interpretative framework within which 
the three articles could be better understood, and it 
also represents analytical contribution on its own. 
In the second part of this introduction we analyse 
overall changes in research funding in CEE countries 
(CEECs), including changes in funding bodies and 
sources of funding, as well as in research performers 
and funding instruments. In the third part we inter-
pret the changes that have taken place by pointing to 
a key trade-off that these systems have to resolve — 
a trade-off between scientific excellence and socio-
economic relevance. Finally, we point to key policy 
challenges which could frame the thinking of sci-
ence policy makers on these issues. 
The following three articles provide more analyti-
cal materials on changes in public funding systems 
in CEECs, focusing specifically on the Czech Re-
public, Estonia and Poland. They are the result of 
systematic work of information and data collection 
to reconstruct the evolution of public funding per-
formed in a project financed by the PRIME Network 
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of Excellence of the 6th European Framework  
Programme. 
Based on these data, the comparative paper by 
Lepori et al (this issue) systematically compares 
public funding in the three countries, looking at the 
portfolio of funding instruments, the nature and role 
of funding agencies and the share of different per-
formers. Finally, it provides a systematic overview 
of the relationships between funding agencies and 
performers and then displays the profound differ-
ences in the ‘market’ organisation of public funding 
in the three considered countries. It shows that, in-
stead of converging towards a western-style model, 
the three considered countries followed very specific 
trajectories strongly influenced by their historic and 
contextual factors at the moment of transition. 
The paper on Estonia by Jaan Masso and Kadri 
Ukrainski (this issue) looks more in-depth at the 
special case of what can be considered a micro re-
search system; thanks to the availability of detailed 
data on allocation of funding by performers, they 
demonstrate that the apparently diversified and 
competitive organisation of funding is matched by 
an extreme concentration at the level of (public sec-
tor) performers; in such a small-scale system, cumu-
lative effects lead to concentration on a few players, 
with potential adverse effects on diversity and long-
term performance. 
Finally, the paper by Julita Jabłecka and 
Benedetto Lepori (this issue) adopts a political  
science approach to reconstruct the reforms in the 
Polish funding system in the period between the be-
ginning of the transition and today. It highlights the 
difficult character of the transition phase, where 
suddenly a new organisation of research policy had 
to be devised and where historical heritage and con-
textual factors played a central role, but also the irre-
sistible attraction of some principles of research 
policy and funding in the European Union, such as 
the separation between policy and funding function, 
differentiation of funding instruments, and creation 
of (semi-) autonomous agencies. 
Patterns of changes in research  
funding and execution 
Funding of research in CEE has undergone signifi-
cant changes in terms of funding sources, performers 
and instruments. The overall transformation was 
shaped by the economic restructuring and by two 
key systemic changes: opening of previously closed 
research systems and gradual introduction of the 
principle of quality in funding criteria. 
In the first phase, a decline in economic develop-
ment came largely as a result of institutional uncer-
tainty, not only in terms of institutional system but 
also in terms of disrupted production, technology 
and trade linkages (Havrylyshyn, 2006; Mickiewicz, 
2005). On the average, decline of GDP was 26%, 
but it was much smaller in central Europe when 
compared to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States countries (former Soviet republics), south-
eastern Europe and the Baltics (EBRD, 2008). 
The common trend was a very sharp decline in 
relative funding for R&D in relation to GDP, where 
the average gross expenditure on R&D (GERD)/ 
GDP ratio in CEE-101 has fallen from well above 
1% to 0.8% in 1994. This shock to the research sys-
tem came due to the complete collapse of demand 
from business as well as a sharp cut in public fund-
ing. A large share of research and development in 
socialist economies was of the ‘reinventing the 
wheel’ type, that is, of the excessive import substitu-
tion type. Hence, demand shock has particularly hit 
applied and development activities which could not 
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find new customers beyond state budget. This first 
stage has induced very different responses in each 
country which depended very much on underlying 
political economy. 
In the second stage, which lasted for the second 
half of the 1990s, institutional change has been more 
incremental and funding reductions gradual, while 
European policy had an increasingly important in-
fluence on national policies (Jabłecka and Lepori, in 
this issue, for the Polish case). As economic growth 
kicked off in all CEE-10 countries in 2000, this led 
to stabilisation of relative R&D expenditures. With 
the continuation of growth but, even more impor-
tantly, with the accession to the EU came an in-
crease in GERD/GDP ratios, which could be largely 
attributed to the EU funding (see below). On the av-
erage of CEE-10, GERD/GDP increased from 
0.75% in 2000 to 0.90% in 2007, with however very 
large differences between countries. GERD/GDP 
exceeds 1.5% in the Czech Republic and Estonia, 
thus approaching the level of some western-
European countries, but it is still below 0.5% of 
GDP in Slovakia and Bulgaria.2 
Changes in funding bodies and instruments 
The main source of funding of R&D in CEE-10 is 
government (49% in 2007) closely followed by in-
dustry (40%). This is typical for countries of this 
level of development, with two richest countries 
(Slovenia and Czech Republic) having shares of in-
dustry above 50%.3 A growth and catch-up should 
lead to increasing share of industry in funding and 
performing R&D. However, this process does not 
seem to be present in the majority of the CEECs as 
the average share of industry in R&D funding has 
not increased in the period 1997–2007. Instead, a 
decreasing share of government funding has been 
compensated by an increasing share of funding from 
abroad (from 6.7% in 1997 to 9.3% in 2007). In the 
aggregate, there have not been substantial changes in 
sources of funding towards the business enterprise 
sector and hence the role of R&D in business inno-
vation has not increased. Instead, domestic R&D has 
become increasingly funded from abroad, thus open-
ing new gaps between domestic R&D and the busi-
ness enterprise sector. 
Public research funding has undergone substantial 
restructuring in most countries, as documented by 
the articles in this thematic section of this issue of 
SPP, as well by reports published by the European 
ERAWATCH research policy observatory. Despite 
national patterns, we can characterise this evolution 
as an overall shift from a long period of poverty of 
funding forms until, in the early 2000s, to a diversi-
fied portfolio of funding instruments. A typical 
situation during the 1990s was the dominance of in-
stitutional funding and small share of grant funding. 
Research systems were based on nominal project 
funding which in reality often operated as de facto 
institutional funding. 
The initial change was the introduction of peer re-
view-based funding agencies such as the Czech 
Grant Agency. Such agencies were established in the 
early to mid-1990s, reflecting a shift towards fund-
ing excellence and principle of competition. How-
ever, the financial share of competitive sources of 
funding remained quite limited, rarely reaching more 
than 10% of the overall public R&D funding. Pro-
gressively, a broader portfolio of funding instru-
ments has been introduced, which now includes 
different types of programmes funding, collaborative 
and co-funded projects (see the case studies pre-
sented in the following articles). 
Despite the lack of systematic data, the share  
of project funding seems to have increased in all 
countries considered, but with very large differences 
among countries. For example, it accounted in 2006 
for only one third of the Polish science budget, a 
share which seems to have strongly increased until 
2009 (Walendowski, 2009). For Bulgaria, the ratio 
between institutional and project funding reached 
35:65% in 2008 against the starting position in 2005 
of 95% institutional and 5% programme-oriented 
funding (Stefanov et al, 2009). At the other extreme, 
in Estonia project funding accounts for about 80% of 
total public funding and in the Czech Republic for 
about 50% (Lepori et al, in this issue). 
Moreover, institutional (block) funding has been 
increasingly accompanied by quality requirements in 
the form of attestation and accreditation certificates 
(Romania), four-year interval evaluations (Slova-
kia), differentiation into three tiers based on quality 
(Poland), or competitive evaluation of so-called re-
search plans submitted by universities to the re-
search ministry in the Czech Republic (Lepori et al, 
in this issue). 
The second stage — establishing independent 
agencies to fund R&D — started in the late 1990s 
and became the dominant trend in mid-2000s with 
EU accession (see the Polish case; Jabłecka and 
Lepori, this issue). An emerging model is dual, that 
is, establishing research and technology agencies. 
Medium-term contractual commitments of agencies 
have brought relative stability of public resources 
despite other pressures on the budget expenses. 
However, organisational settings of research funding 
widely differ across countries, as displayed by the 
three case studies in this special thematic section of 
this issue of SPP. 
Changes in funding bodies and sources since the 
mid-2000s strongly reflect Europeanisation of R&D 
systems of the CEE-10. Europeanisation has been 
characterised by: 
• The decentralisation of the decision-making sys-
tem; 
• The externalisation of the R&D management into 
agencies; 
• The gradual increase of competition-based fund-
ing of R&D; 
• The diversity and flexibility of funding sources; 
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and 
• The promotion of excellent R&D performers. 
Starting with the 5th Framework Programme (FP), 
European funding mechanisms also played an im-
portant role in the establishment of networks of cen-
tres of excellence in all CEE-10. The EU’s structural 
funds have provided the funding for the launching of 
new thematic programs, for modernising research, 
funding science excellence or research–industry 
competence centres, boosting government support to 
business R&D, etc. (for changes in this respect for 
Estonia, see Rannala, 2009). 
Changes in R&D performers 
Changes in the structure of the performing of R&D 
have been more significant than changes in the fund-
ing sources. Share of business enterprise sector 
(BES) and higher education sector (HES) in per-
formed R&D has increased by 9 and 10 percentage 
points respectively between 2007 and 1997 (see  
Table 1). This increase has been accompanied by 
decline in share of performed R&D in the govern-
ment sector by 4 percentage points. Increasing share 
of performed R&D by BES and HES has been 
funded mainly by relatively unchanged but in real 
terms increased government and funding from 
abroad. A high dependence of BES on public funds 
is characteristic only of Romania and Slovakia. 
Shares of other CEECs are comparable to shares of 
the ‘old’ EU-15. 
However, CEECs followed different paths also in 
restructuring their research sector. The biggest 
change took place in the Baltic states which inher-
ited large, Soviet-era, industrial research facilities 
perceived by the new government as ‘alien’ to local 
economies. As a result the Baltic states did not try to 
preserve them and have instead opted for a policy 
which would support excellence in basic research, 
assuming that the market will take care of those re-
search activities for which there is no justification 
based on a market-failure argument (Masso and 
Ukrainski, in this issue). 
A majority of other countries have adopted a pol-
icy of passive adjustment, opting for a gradual 
change in research policy and gradual introduction 
of excellence criteria in funding but not trying to  
actively restructure R&D institutes. The radical and 
active restructuring was applied only in eastern 
Germany where, after individual evaluations a so-
called Blaue List, institutes were formed which were 
selected for temporary restructuring support. A simi-
larly radical but passive policy of privatisation of in-
dustrial R&D institutes was adopted in Czech 
Republic. 
In other countries, R&D institutes were faced 
with radically reduced budgets, with gradual intro-
duction of competition type of funding through 
new agencies but whose budget was not very sub-
stantial. This led to a variety of adjustment strate-
gies of R&D institutes, many of which opted to 
move upstream towards basic research where they 
knew that the state would still preserve its funding 
responsibility. Romanian policy was probably the 
most reluctant to change funding criteria of R&D 
institutes and has effectively provided them with 
implicit subsidy. 
Different underlying political economies have 
also determined the fate of academies of sciences, 
which in all countries were the dominant actor in 
public research under the Communist regime. In 
countries where they were seen as a strong remnant 
of the Soviet system, as in Baltics, they were abol-
ished in their old form. In other countries, they have 
been losing their function of funding agency, as in 
Poland, where their institutes are entirely funded by 
research ministry (Jabłecka and Lepori, in this  
issue), while in yet other cases their size has been 
reduced, but they kept essentially their organisations 
and functions (as in the Czech Republic; Lepori et 
al, in this issue) or even are still the dominant player 
in the public research sector, as in Bulgaria (Sime-
onova, 2006) and Hungary (Havas, 2007; Mosoni-
Fried, 2004). In all countries, higher education insti-
tutions have emerged as a major player in public re-
search, but there are still large differences between 
countries in this respect. 
In between scientific excellence and  
socio-economic relevance 
In the previous section we briefly overviewed 
changes in R&D funding in CEE-10 from a macro 
perspective. However, to evaluate these changes we 
need to go beyond this static and aggregated view 
towards taking into account the micro structure of 
funding systems and performers, as well as dynamic 
effects related to selection environments and incen-
tive systems. 
From macro to micro structure of R&D systems 
We conceptualise research systems as an interaction 
space between funding agencies on one side, per-
formers on the other side (Lepori et al, in this issue), 
where performers provide research services in ex-
change for funding from different types of agencies. 
Table 1. Shares in gross expenditure on research and 
development of CEE-10 performed by different 
sectors, in percentages 
 1998 2000 2004 2007 
Business enterprises 50 47 48 46 
Government 30 30 29 28 
Higher education 20 23 23 26 
Source:  Eurostat2 
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From this perspective, at the micro level, there is 
a strong case for a diversified supply (R&D per-
forming) and demand (funding bodies) in R&D, be-
cause this would allow for competition, but would 
also keep diversity of actors and solutions to scien-
tific and societal problems. 
In central and eastern European countries, the 
pre-1989 market structure was characterised by a 
limited number of research and development per-
formers in individual S&T areas and a limited 
number of funding bodies. The system was operat-
ing through hierarchy, based on bargaining as the 
dominant governance mechanism, mostly through 
the top-down organisation of academies of sci-
ences. The reforms brought a much larger auton-
omy of research performers, a diversification of 
funding sources and a clearer separation of func-
tions between funders and performers; one would 
then expect a shift towards diversified structure as 
illustrated in Table 2. 
However, as two articles in this themed section 
of this issue of SPP illustrate, this evolution is not 
inevitable. In case of Estonia, the market structure 
is characterised by a small number of R&D per-
formers but diversified funding sources (Masso and 
Ukrainski, in this issue). In Poland, types of com-
peting R&D performers have increased but funding 
remained at least until recently, concentrated within 
the ministry and based on strongly top-down 
mechanisms. 
In the Estonian case, concentration on the per-
formers’ side was strongly favoured by the small 
size of the country and by the integration of the for-
mer institutes of the Academy of Sciences in the ex-
isting universities; as the paper by Masso and 
Ukrainski (this issue) shows; cumulative effects due 
to a funding policy rewarding existing excellence re-
inforced this pattern in the last decade. 
In the Polish case, concentration on the funding 
side was an outcome of the specific path of reforms 
at the breakdown of the Communist regime, where 
the principles of the Republic of Science were in-
fused in the centralised organisational form  
inherited from the Communist regime (Jabłecka 
and Lepori, this issue). While path dependency  
and political dimensions were decisive in this pro-
cess, more recently diversification of funding 
agency is taking place, mostly under the pressure 
of Europeanisation. 
Looking to selection environment 
The Estonian case displays that the market structure 
is only partially shaped by external factors, but to a 
large extent is endogenously generated by the inter-
action between funding rules and the action of fund-
ing agencies on one side and the strategic objectives 
and capabilities of key R&D performers on the other 
side. 
Hence, intensity of competition, structure and qual-
ity of demand to which they are exposed operate as 
important incentives for indirect restructuring. By 
this, we mean the creation of an environment in which 
institutes restructure themselves by being exposed to 
the market and to changes in funding criteria in the di-
rection of competitive public funding. Public agen-
cies, as the main funders of R&D institutes, have 
opportunities to use funding criteria to speed up the 
restructuring of institutes. The tightness of funding 
criteria and type of funding (institutional funding, 
block grants, project grants or co-financing) influence 
how quickly institutes will be forced to restructure the 
profile of their activities and/or turn to market. 
Moreover, even if the focus of this themed section 
of this issue of SPP is on public funding, R&D or-
ganisations operate in reality in two markets: a 
‘quasi market’ for public funds; and a private market 
for R&D contracts, services and products. The state 
of this market is largely determined by the general 
state of the economy (growth, stagnation), and by 
the demand of enterprises for external R&D ser-
vices, in particular. In the CEE-10 the value of the 
R&D market has shrunk significantly during the 
1990s which in turn limits restructuring options. 
On the other hand, a majority of the CEE-10 has 
pursued for a long period a policy of ‘soft’ funding 
of R&D institutes which reduced the pressure on 
them to restructure. Although such a policy seems to 
make sense and can be justified by a strategy of sup-
porting domestic science, if pursued for too long and 
as the sole policy, it leads to a gradual erosion of 
those R&D groups that would deserve stronger sup-
port and to the survival of those that, in the long 
term, cannot survive. 
From static efficiency to dynamic efficiency 
However, this is a static view of the situation, which 
assumes that there is one optimal market structure 
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with diversified R&D performers and funding bod-
ies. In reality R&D funding systems have to meet 
different contradictory requirements; they have to 
ensure world scientific excellence but should also be 
oriented towards needs of local stakeholders which 
are not necessarily contributing to world science but 
to local technology generation. Moreover, achieve-
ment of short-term efficiency is not necessarily iden-
tical with long-term (dynamic) efficiency. Hence, in 
conceptual terms, R&D funding systems should be 
judged on how they achieve the balance between 
these different objectives — depending on specific 
local conditions — rather than just whether their 
market structure is optimal from some external ex-
ogenous criterion. 
Allocative efficiency in research is a situation in 
which limited resources for R&D are allocated in 
accordance with the criteria of (current) world scien-
tific excellence. In practical terms, this means allo-
cating funding based on past performance, since in 
the short term this is the best predictor of future re-
search production. The widespread adoption of qual-
ity evaluation mechanisms and of peer review for 
project funding is a step in this direction and this is 
progress compared with the allocation practices un-
der the Communist regime. However, from a long-
term perspective, it is critical that the research sys-
tem is able to quickly respond to new scientific de-
velopments and enter emerging fields, as well as to 
produce unforeseen innovations and to respond to 
new demands from stakeholders. This translates in 
two requirements: 
• Keeping a sufficient diversity of performers and 
letting new players enter the market; and 
• Being able to rapidly move resources from tradi-
tional to emerging fields. (Bonaccorsi, 2007) 
A dynamically efficient funding system appropri-
ately balances short-run concerns of static efficiency 
with the long-run concerns of meeting changing 
needs of local stakeholders and changing scientific 
priorities. How to achieve this balance depends on 
local conditions, and in small countries there is cer-
tainly some point in giving diversity needs special 
attention because of the small size of the system and 
because national policies need a suitable mix be-
tween promoting current excellent fields and letting 
new areas emerge where the country may be initially 
inferior. 
In our view, while much progress has been made 
in promoting autonomy and openness of research 
system and some improvements have taken place in 
achieving competition, in CEECs the socio-
economic (industrial) relevance of R&D systems is 
their least developed dimension. Competition as ar-
gued above is still undeveloped and the current pe-
riod could be characterised as transitory towards a 
competition-based model. When compared to the 
socialist period, R&D systems have become much 
more autonomous and open. 
However, the evidence for CEE-10 suggests that, 
in public R&D, setting of priorities internal to the 
science system dominates, with little regard for ex-
ternal knowledge demand. As pointed in the 2009 
EW Policy Report mix for Hungary (Havas, 2009) 
several systems for identification of knowledge de-
mand exist, but translation of identified priorities 
and knowledge demand to funding programmes of 
the public institutions is slow and not systematic. 
Funding criteria are usually based on academic out-
put, which does not contribute to improved local 
relevance. 
On the other hand, in some countries, such as 
Slovakia, national thematic R&D priorities are only 
partly reflected in the actual public R&D funding 
(Baláž, 2009). In short, there is a strong need for 
R&D funding schemes to be much closer to societal 
needs and this would require much stronger in-
volvement of users in evaluation and funding. 
In addition, an integration of domestic performers 
into the EU networks has led to improvements in 
terms of quality and international excellence, as the 
best national performers will be plugged into Euro-
pean research networks, but not necessarily in terms 
of local relevance. As the best groups become inte-
grated into EU networks there is a risk that the gap 
between them and the local business sector will 
widen. Without policy actions, the situation in CEE-
10 may resemble the situation in Greece where a 
competent R&D system has relatively limited links 
to the domestic business sector. 
Institutional issues in system restructuring 
In view of different trade-offs that R&D systems are 
facing, the relevant issue is: How do we evaluate 
whether the balance between them has been 
achieved? The achievement of this balance is an insti-
tutional issue par excellence; it does not represent op-
timum but contextual fit, and is determined through 
interaction of macro funding rules and market struc-
ture of R&D. In order to evaluate this fit we should 
approach R&D funding systems as a multifaceted 
process composed of functional, path-dependent and 
political as well as learning dimensions. 
Socialist R&D systems could not survive in their 
old form as they were dysfunctional to new eco-
nomic and political systems. Their old organisational 
structures were not able to exploit the new opportu-
nities that have emerged with autonomy, openness 
and competition. So, the majority of actors have re-
alised that the perceived benefits of the new system 
would exceed costs. 
However, if this functional view of the situation 
was entirely right we would have seen much more 
radical and quicker change in R&D systems. Instead, 
the pace and pattern of institutional change was 
much more complex, reflecting several other dimen-
sions which are characteristic of any institutional 
change. As argued by Schmidt (2004), in addition to 
functional aspects we should bear in mind path  
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dependency in this process, the issue of power poli-
tics and capacity of different R&D systems to learn 
(see Jabłecka and Lepori, in this issue). 
Power politics played important role in determin-
ing the type of change along which R&D funding 
will evolve during the 1990s, for example, in the 
Baltics in determining the shape of radical change  
in their systems, in particular in the treatment of  
Soviet-era industrial institutes. On the other hand 
and closely linked to power politics is path depend-
ency (isomorphism) or stability of funding arrange-
ments despite great environmental change, 
especially during the 1990s. Thus, continuous func-
tioning of academies of sciences could be explained 
by vested interests of the science establishment but 
also by path dependency. So, the realised institu-
tional change should be seen more as reflecting a 
mixture of functional change, power politics and 
path-dependency processes. 
In addition, these processes are dynamic in the 
sense that Schmidt put it: 
new objectives, ideologies, and values are 
learned without anyone necessarily consciously 
trying to shape them. (2004: 263) 
In the most obvious manner this is present in  
country-specific administrative capacities and differ-
ent mechanism of coordination and accumulated 
learning in R&D policy. For example, turnover of 
ministries and learning at civil-servant level is an 
important factor in explaining emerging differences 
in quality of R&D policies. The Europeanisation and 
learning of the EU rules and policies and their crea-
tive adaptation and exploitation to a country’s bene-
fit are important explanatory factors in differences 
between emerging countries. 
So, from institutional perspective, achieving bal-
ance between world excellence and local relevance 
is an institutional issue process par excellence. Its 
outcome does not represent optimum but contextual 
fit, and is determined through interaction of macro 
funding rules and market structure of R&D. This fit 
is an outcome of institutional change which is a mix-
ture of functional, path-dependent and political as 
well as learning dimensions. 
Policy issues 
In conclusion we highlight three important policy is-
sues which emerge from this analysis. 
Changes in public funding criteria without  
organisational restructuring at micro level 
 will not suffice 
Passive or indirect restructuring induced through 
changes in the funding regime under which institutes 
operate (funding criteria; evaluation procedures) 
may not change market structure. On the other hand, 
active or direct restructuring of R&D organisations 
in terms of privatisation, splitting-up into coherent 
activities, liquidation, conversion or reorganisation 
into cost/profit centres may not suffice without 
changes in framework conditions. 
Policy should aim to enhance complementarities 
between diversity of funding bodies, instruments and 
market structure of R&D performers. The pattern of 
change should be towards diversity of funding bod-
ies and R&D performers. This can be achieved by 
complementing changes in funding regimes by ac-
tive hands on restructuring of major R&D perform-
ers. (For a model of such an approach, see 
Radosevic, 2009.) The advantage of an active ap-
proach is that it directly addresses restructuring is-
sues and is thus relatively more effective than 
changes induced through funding criteria. However, 
its drawback is that it requires a consensus of inter-
ested parties and is administratively intensive. 
Moreover, until now, the major channels for im-
provements in national innovation systems in CEE-
10 have been vertical linkages: in upstream areas of 
R&D through FPs and in downstream areas through 
knowledge transfers via foreign direct investment 
(FDI) and industrial networks. However, integration 
of these countries through vertical R&D and FDI 
knowledge flows leads to horizontal fragmentation 
of the national innovation system, while horizontal 
linkages between public R&D and domestic BES 
and with FDI are crucial but currently the weakest. 
Research capacities should be better linked to firm-
level demand through an increased share of co-
funding mechanisms involving the BES. 
Diversifying funding bodies and R&D performers by 
itself will not suffice to meet the most important  
policy challenge: balance between R&D excellence 
and local relevance 
Policy should prioritise locally relevant but inter-
nationally excellent R&D (see Table 3). As this may 
not be possible in many areas in CEE-10, the prior-
ity will be given to the second-best area, to islands 
of excellence but locally not necessarily relevant re-
search. Areas that are locally relevant but are of poor 
international quality are the cases of ‘policy myo-
pia’, that is, opportunities not addressed by policy, 
however, where structural actions to improve the 
Table 3. Matrix of relevance and excellence 
 Locally relevant Locally irrelevant 
Excellence 1.  First best/virtuous 
cycle 
2.  Second best/islands 
of excellence but not 
relevant locally 
Non-excellence 3.  Third best/locally 
relevant but 
mediocre R&D 
4.  Bad strategic 
option/locally 
irrelevant and 
mediocre in terms of 
quality/vicious cycle 
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quality in these areas could be critical for economic 
development. Of course, public policies should try to 
avoid funding of locally irrelevant and internation-
ally non-excellent research, which nowadays proba-
bly still includes most research activities in these 
countries. The impact of the European Research 
Area (ERA) will be in reducing fourth quadrant and 
increasing second quadrant. However, it is not cer-
tain what will be the effects of ERA on the first and 
third quadrant and thus national targeted policies 
might be required. 
A better coordination between cohesion, structural 
funds and the research framework programmes 
policies is warranted 
However, it is not clear whether better connection 
between structural funds and FPs will lead to any-
thing but to new research, technology and develop-
ment (RTD) capacities which are not necessarily 
relevant to the local economy, unless the approach to 
structural funds is re-examined. 
There is evidence that the incentive provided by 
them primarily stimulates financial absorption rather 
than ensuring long-term effects. The procedures in-
volved are often further complicated by the rules of 
national administrations and are not leveraging  
national innovation capacities. An overall re-
evaluation is needed to assess the role of structural 
funds in building firm and industry-specific infra-
structures with strong linkages to public research 
systems, as a means of attracting additional or em-
bedding existing FDI. There is evidence that struc-
tural funds are currently used as a substitute for 
national funding in RTD in CEE-10, but they should 
be re-converted into complementary funding as this 
the best way to ensure local relevance. 
In both cases, the complementary national fund-
ing will be easier to realise if there is a conscious 
push to ensure local relevance. This may lead to 
smaller financial benefits for CEE-10 but will ensure 
higher local relevance of funded RTD activities. In-
creased participation of business enterprise sector in 
FP, community innovation programs and other EU 
programs would be also essential in this respect. 
Notes 
1. In this paper we include in CEE countries 10 new member 
states of the European Union (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slove-
nia and Slovakia; CEE-10). However, our analysis and  
results are of high relevance also for other CEE countries from 
south-eastern Europe (western Balkans) and for Common-
wealth of Independent States countries (former Soviet repub-
lics) as well as for ex-Communist economies of Asia. 
2. Eurostat: <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>, last accessed 1 Sep-
tember 2009. 
3. A high share of industry R&D funding for Latvia probably re-
flects weaknesses in R&D statistics, in particular in classifying 
business enterprise R&D organisations. 
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